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David Kairys *
Traditional jurisprudence removes law from its historical and
-social context and function and portrays it as an objective, almost
timeless science. The law and the state are commonly characterized
as neutral, value-free arbiters, independent of underlying social re-
lations and political forces.
For example, consider the jurisprudential underpinnings of a
typical law school class studying the right to speak on a public street
corner. Such topics as the application of the first amendment to
the states and the role of federal courts concerning individual free-
doms would be explored. These concepts and their development
would be discussed as abstract legal questions, with some reference to
equally abstract notions of how a society should deal with dissent.
The courts would be depicted as grappling with these legal questions
and arriving at the ultimate (present) wisdom by objectively analyz-
ing and balancing rights and interests. Social and political forces
and the ideological perspectives of judges would be considered ir-
relevant to this legal process. The early cases I on the right-in
which it was flatly and unanimously denied on the basis of counter-
vailing property rights-would be of little, if any, concern, nor would
the fact that the right was first constitutionally protected 2 in the
* B.S., Cornell, 1965; LL.B., Columbia, 1968; LL.M., University of Pennsyl-
vania, 1971. Member of the Pennsylvania and District of Columbia Bars. Member
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I In Davis v. Massachusetts, 167 U.S. 43 (1897), a Jehovah's Witness minister
was denied the right to speak and distribute a religious leaflet on Boston Commons,
a public park, based on a city ordinance that prohibited "any public address" on
public grounds without a permit from the mayor. The Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts, in an opinion by Justice Holmes, had upheld the ordinance based
on the property rights of the city:
That such an ordinance is constitutional ... does not appear to us open
to doubt .... For the Legislature absolutely or conditionally to forbid
public speaking in a highway or public park is no more an infringement
of the rights of a member of the public than for the owner of a private
house to forbid it in his house.
Commonwealth v. Davis, 162 Mass. 510, 511 (1895), aff'd, 167 U.S. 43 (1897).
The Supreme Court of the United States unanimously affirmed, quoting Justice
Holmes' analogy to a private house. 167 U.S. at 47.
2 Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939); Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938).
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context of a mass movement that demanded recognition of unions,
collective bargaining and democratic rights of free speech and that
posed a distinct threat to the existing order.3
Law and the Rise of Capitalism almost exclusively concerns
western Europe in the period 1000 to 1804, but the authors have set
out a Marxian jurisprudence and political perspective that provides
a realistic basis for understanding our history and the role of the
law in the United States. Relying on meticulous research, they
examine the transformation from feudalism to capitalism in terms
of changing material conditions and social relations and the groups
and ideologies that competed for hegemony, with particular empha-
sis on the role of law and lawyers. They identify the evolving
interests and ideologies of feudal lords, monarchs, clerics, peasants,
workers, and the emerging and ultimately victorious merchant class,
or bourgeoisie,4 and they explain 800 years of struggle-during
which the feudal order was nudged, reformed, confronted and
eventually crushed-in terms of those changing conditions and rela-
tions and competing interests and ideologies. The result is fasci-
nating history and a jurisprudence that provides both a theoretical
and practical understanding of the law.
I.
Law and the Rise of Capitalism is organized into six parts: an
overview is presented in the first and conclusions in the last; the
core of the book consists of four parts that concern the periods 1000
to 1200, 1200 to 1400, 1400 to 1600, and 1600 to 1804. The analysis
"move[s] from specific events to general principles and trends" 5 and
is based on extensive historical research, including, for example,
examination of the terms of early private contracts.
3 The treatment of this issue in two widely used constitutional Jaw case books
is illustrative. In E. BAuRETr & P. BEuTON, CoNsTrruToIAL LAw, CASES AND
MAT'mxAs (1973), Hague and Lovell as well as Davis are not even in the index
of cases. There is a detailed history of freedom of speech and press in England
starting with the Middle Ages, id. 1102-05, but no historical analysis of these rights
in the United States. The authors state that "the Supreme Court, during the first
130 years of its life, had no occasion to interpret this guaranty [of freedom of
speech and assembly]." Id. 1106. In G. GuNTsmu, CONSTruTIoNAL LAW, CASEs
AN MATmuALs (9th ed. 1975), Hague and Lovell are reproduced at some length
and Davis is mentioned in a footnote, id. 1146 n.*, but there is no historical dis-
cussion or analysis, and these cases are not placed in their social and politica
contexts.
4 The term "bourgeois" first appeared in a French charter of 1007 and was
soon used throughout Europe. M. TIcAR & M. LEv, LAw AND T=l RIsE OF
CAPrrAuslm 84 (1977) [hereinafter cited as TiGAR- & lEvY].
1id. xiw.
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In most modern western societies,, successful merchants epito-
mize established respectability, but when they first -appeaied in
western Europe, about 1000 A.D., they were derided and scorned.
"Profit-taking was considered a form of usury, and the merchant's
soul was thought to be in jeopardy." 6 Frequently subject to violent
attack, these early merchants were skilled at combat and often
traveled in well-armed bands.
Though not yet organized or conscious of themselves as a social
force, the emerging merchant class sought to create conditions con-
ducive to trade and, later, to manufacture. These conditions in-
cluded the right of all people 7 to make enforceable contracts. and to
buy and sell goods, materials and labor; mechanisms for transmitting
funds, credit and insurance; and guaranteed physical security.
8
Such a system-containing the seeds of capitalism 9-was irrecon-
cilable with and directly challenged the feudal order, and the early
merchants were considered rebels and criminals.10 The political and
social ideology of feudalism was based on the duties and responsi-
bilities that define the relationship between lords and vassals. The
lord reigned supreme and owned everything in his territorial
0Id. 4.
7 This did not include racial minorities or women, nor did it preclude slavery.
Later, Montesquieu, whose philosophy of freedom is basic to American and all
western thought, condemned slavery, but he had some exceptions. A shareholder
in the India Company, Montesquieu observed that "[slugar would be too expensive
if one did not use slave labor." TICAI & I-vY, supra note 4, at 254. To dis-
tinguish exploitation of slave labor in the Third World, of which he approved,
Montesquieu relied not on the need for goods or profits but on natural reason:
"It must be said that slavery is against nature, though in certain countries it is
founded upon natural reason. One must distinguish between such countries and
those in which natural reasons reject it. One must therefore limit slavery to certain
portions of the earth." Id. 253-54.
8Id. 4.
9 Whether the mercantile activity of this period is "capitalism" depends largely
on one's definition of the term. M. DOBB, STuDias IN THE DEvELOPNMNT OF
CAPITALrsM 1-32 (1947). Tigar and Levy do not attempt to define capitalism,
but, in describing 11th and 12th century commerce, refer to the "growing power
of a [merchant] class that possessed capital and the means to increase it," and
aclmowledge the phenomenon as "merchant capitalism." TmAn & LEVY, supra
note 4, at 66, 97. Such a view comports with those identifying capitalism loosely,
as a calculating, systematic, acquisitive impulse to amass profit. See H. PEnNE,
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL I"sTORY OF MEDIEvAL EuRoPE 163 (1936) ("[Mledieval
sources place the existence of capitalism in the twelfth century beyond a doubt.");
M. Wnua, ThE P OTESTANT Enuc AND THE SPrrT OF CAPrrTAnsM (T. Parsons
transl. 1930); 1 W. SoM-AIT, DER MoDmun KAPrrALismus 25 (1928). It
departs from Marx's view of capitalism as an ordering of the relationship among
people based on ownership of the means of production by a discrete class. See,
e.g., 1 K. MAnx, CAPrAL 751, 756 (Int'l Publ. ed. 1967). Capitalism in this sense
did not arise until the 16th century, M. DOBB, supra, at 18. Tigar and Levy
recognize the distinction, TsGAr & LEvy, supra note 4, at 180, but capably demon-
strate the singular role of law in both the earlier and later processes.
10 TiAR & L.vy, supra note 4, at 4.
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domain; he had a duty to provide for the necessities and safety of his
charges. The vassal family was bound to the land, could not sell
even most movable property or marry without the lord's permission,
and had a duty to provide troops and provisions for the lord's army.
Feudal law, based on this social relationship and ideology, was
characterized by two principles: personality of law and customary
laws applied over a given territory."1 The principle of personality
of law, derived from Roman law, applied different bodies of law to
persons of different statuses and from different places. This gave way
to a system of uniform application to all within the lord's domain.
The struggle of the merchants, and whatever allies they could
muster, and the competing interests and ideologies underlying feu-
dalism and capitalism form the basis for understanding the history
of western Europe from 1000 to 1804. In this struggle, attempts
were made to "reform" the feudal system to accommodate the in-
terests of the merchants. The legal ideologists-lawyers-of the
merchant class first "sought to justify the place of trade in the sym-
metry of the feudal system. They . . sought accommodation with,
and weak spots in, feudal law." 12 For example, the personality of
law tradition in feudal law was used as a lever for incorporating into
the feudal legal system a law of commerce to be applied to merchants.
Later, the merchants "discovered the points at which the legal sys-
tem could no longer be bent to [their] will, accommodated at an
affordable price, or evaded." '3 They established alternative legal
institutions and "zones of free commerce," and they developed an
ideology that based freedom of action for businessmen on natural
law and natural reason, much as feudal ideology used religion to
justify and enforce feudal social relations. The long process of
change moved from accommodation to often violent confrontation,
14
and the victory of the merchant class was ultimately won by armed
conflict. In this process,
Bourgeois ideas of contract and property in land did
not spread over wider areas because they were necessarily
better than other ideas; they spread from the urban nuclei
of bourgeois power because they represented a system of
economic relations uniquely adapted to the level of technol-
ogy and learning of a certain time. Their implacable tend-
" Id. 25.
12 Id. 5.
13 Id.
14 There was sporadic violence throughout the struggle, such as the beheading
of a bishop in 1112 by 40 merchants because of the bishop's reneging on a grant
of power to their cooperative enterprise. Id. 87.
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ency was to dissolve old relations of production and ex-
change. As-Marx also wrote: "Agriculture comes to be
more and more merely a branch of industry and is com-
pletely dominated by capital . ... Capital is the all-
dominating power of bourgeois society." 15
In the period 1000 to 1200, the early merchants, mainly urban
dwellers from the lower levels of society, sought legal recognition
within the feudal order and
demanded one major concession from the seigneur: a
charter, drawn in accordance with the law of the place, set-
ting out that there existed-as there had not existed before
-the status of bourgeois, burgher, or burgess, and establish-
ing that this status implied certain rights and duties.16
The Crusades, 1095 to 1291, played a crucial role in this
struggle. Christian religious shrines and pilgrims were being treated
with hostility in the east, and religious fervor was surely aroused.
But there was also a growing demand for eastern goods, and the
Crusades helped solve some domestic problems and furthered bour-
geois interests.
Crusading combined two worthy objectives-making the
Holy Land safe for merchants and for religious pilgrim-
age-with a worthy means of accomplishing them, namely,
getting an increasingly restive, violent and socially unpro-
ductive class of soldiers, knights, and petty nobles out of
the way.
The crusading army was recruited from that portion of
the feudal ruling class which was most actively battling
with the merchants. The church and some of the more
powerful seigneurs, aided by the nascent bourgeoisie, had
already begun to struggle to curtail private feudal warfare,
and the impediments to trade posed by feudal tolls, tariffs,
and outright brigandage. 17
15 Id. 312.
16 Id. 111. These charters gave legal sanction to establishment of "communes"
or "custumnals," which gained the right of a municipal assembly to make laws and
hold court. They were cooperative in their operation, with the debts of each
bourgeois assumed as a collective responsibility and competition among themselves
prohibited. Id. 91-95.
17 Id. 58-59. Primogeniture, a creation of feudalism, led to a feudal identity
crisis for the younger sons of nobles; the Crusades provided them a cause and a
source of enrichment.
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The need for large amounts of capital to finance the Crusades and
the opening of trade routes provided a further impetus to recogni-
tion of mercantile interests.' 8
The authors are not the first 19 to contest Weber's postulate of a
unique correspondence between Protestantism and the capitalist
spirit,20 but their book marshalls a credible case for the pre-Refor-
mation role of the Church in nurturing capitalism.21 The Church,
at first hostile to the merchants, soon became the primary financial
beneficiary of trade, and Church doctrine was overhauled. Itinerant
merchants were protected as pilgrims, Church resources were devoted
to the study of Roman and commercial law, and "[t]he concept of
just price was turned on its head by canonical theorists to become
'that price prevailing in the market.' " 2
The mercantile law urged upon the feudal legal system was not
presented as original. "Rather, the bourgeois sought old legal forms
and principles, chiefly Roman, and invested them with a new com-
mercial content." 23 The Twelfth Century Renaissance was not the
result of some abstract development of legal theory, nor was it, or
the development of commercial civilization, solely a western phenom-
enon.2 4 The resurrection of Roman law, and other sources of com-
mercial law, followed the change in material conditions and the
18The Crusades represented, therefore, an economic opportunity, quite
apart from which side was militarily victorious. The opportunity repre-
sented by the increase in Eastern trade could not, however, be exploited
without legal and institutional forms to permit the pooling of capital to
fund large sea and land enterprises, to assure a protected market for the
merchants who did gather the necessary capital, and to provide for the
distribution of goods from the East in exchange for those from the West.
Id. 62.
19 See M. DOB, supra note 9, at 9 n.1 (collecting authorities).
2
0M. WEraEn, THE POTEsTANT ETmc AND T=E Spnrr OF CAPrrLsm
(T. Parsons transl. 1930).
21 TiGAs & LEvY, supra note 4, at 102-10.
221d. 107. The principle of just price, derived from Roman Law, previously
meant "that price that would reflect the intrinsic worth of the article sold as well
as a fair remuneration for the work." Id. 107.
23id. 6.
24The voyagers East discovered a civilization-indeed, civilizations-far
more advanced than their own. They discovered Arab science, including
medical learning. They discovered, and we know that they brought back,
a system of mathematics based upon nine numbers and zero, which re-
placed the cumbersome Roman numeral system. A bit later they brought
back rudimentary entry bookkeeping. And St. Thomas Aquinas erected
his neo-Aristotelian philosophical system upon an Arabic translation of that
philosopher.
The traders who returned from the East brought Roman law, too, or
at least a more systematic and commercially usable version of it than had
survived anywhere in the West.
Id. 72-73.
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ascendancy of bourgeois social relations. And about the time the
Crusades were beginning, there appeared "a new group of profes-
sionals, identified principally with the large merchants"-lawyers. 24-
From 1200 to 1400, the bourgeoisie, still seeking change within
the feudal order (and attempting to be recognized as nobles them-
selves), sought the favor of royalty, and royal power and bourgeois
influence grew in tandem. Royalty sought sovereignty, not just a
seat at the head of the feudal hierarchy, and the. extension of the
royal power to legislate, control the judicial process and intervene
in the affairs of the cities. Sovereignty held by a royalty favorable
to trade meant that commerce could proceed without the conflicting
jurisdictions and claims of the feudal lords. By supporting the
bourgeoisie, who would later turn against them, the monarchs gained
revenue from trade and important allies in their struggles against
the feudal prerogatives of the lords.
In the period 1400 to 1600, manufacture and merchant invest-
ment in production emerged, and the bourgeoisie championed
political forms most conducive to the production and free movement
of goods.
[T]he medieval ideal of a town as the common possession
of the inhabitants, descendants of those who had united
upon their solemn oaths, was giving way. The "corpora-
tion" came to mean the town officials, the wealthiest and
most powerful of the inhabitants, who treated the town's
property as their own, selling it and pocketing the proceeds.
In order to accommodate the rationalization of produc-
tion, fields had to be enclosed, guild privileges overridden
in charters to companies of entrepreneurs and exporters,
and land laws rewritten; the task required a powerful,
centralized authority, and the bourgeoisie were early cham-
pions of a powerful state apparatus. Nation states like
England and France, which managed to unite around a
strong central power, survived and were strengthened by
the economic turmoil.26
25 Id. 62. The formalities of the law, making the use of a lawyer an expensive
necessity, led to early hostility towards lawyers, particularly by poor people. In
the 13th century, the following was a popular poem about a lawyer who served the
poor:
St. Ives is from Brittany
A lawyer but not a thief
Such a thing is beyond beliefi
Id. 162.
20 Id. 193. Tigar and Levy examine the life and work of Thomas More in
explaining this process. Id. 187-95.
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The law of real property was recast to reflect the bourgeois concepts
of exclusive ownership of a thing (res) by a person (persona).27 In
England, Henry VIII, wielding state power with no pretence of
neutrality,28 seized monastic lands in what is often depicted as a per-
sonal dispute with the Pope. These lands, at first generally thought
to be retained by the crown, were turned over to the bourgeoisie.
"[T]he efficient exploitation of these properties for mercantile pur-
poses meant drawing together the production of raw wool and the
manufacture of cloth; this in turn entailed the enclosure of the com-
mons and the conversion of the villagers to wage-laborers." 29
The development of contract law in this period-often char-
acterized as a cause of the change from feudalism to capitalism-
followed from changing conditions and the ascendancy of the bour-
geoisie and bourgeois ideology.
[B]ourgeois social relations will [not] come into being, re-
gardless of material conditions, whenever the legal idea of
free bargain is sufficiently developed. The law of contract
did not burst into existence and become established on the
basis of the self evident justice of its principles. The field
in which contracts operate is limited by the system of eco-
nomic relations and this system is in turn determined by
the level of technology, the strength of the opposing classes,
and in general, the state of development of the forces of
production. Having access to a sophisticated theory of con-
tract is no guarantee of the presence of the ensemble of
forces needed to put it to work.80
With the ascendancy of bourgeois legal ideology,
[n]o longer, as in the feudal period, could landed property,
its exploitation and defense, mediate the legal relations be-
tween people. Property became the relationship of persona
27 Feudal notions of land ownership and use were nonexclusive. "[Lland
might be held in common, or a piece of land might be used at different seasons by
different persons for the benefit of the community." Id. 197.
28 The eighteenth-century bourgeois notion of the laissez-faire state as
neutral arbiter was nowhere in evidence in Tudor England; the state was
concededly an instrument, shared by the Crown and its powerful allies, to
smash resistance to a new system of social relations. The later legal
ideology of property as a natural right was an ideology for those who
already owned land or were in the process of acquiring it in the normal
course of trade; it was another way of saying that whoever had managed
to capture a portion of the earth in the previous hundred years' troubles
ought to be able to keep it.
Id. 208.
29 Id. 205. See K. MAmX, supra note 9, at ch. xxvii.
30 TicAR & Lvr, supra note 4, at 212.
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and res. The contract-to work, to sell, even to live in
marriage-took pride of place.8 '
Just after 1600, Coke declared that the law merchant was part of the
common law; "common lawyers and common-law courts would
thenceforth serve the interests of merchants." 832
The period 1600-1804 saw bourgeois victory over the feudal
lords and feudalism, and over the monarchs 3 3 and the newer allies
of the bourgeoisie, workers and peasants. In France, the Third
Estate, which included the wealthy bourgeoisie, professionals, crafts-
men, artisans, wage-laborers and agricultural smallholders, was
united and led by the bourgeoisie. In 1789 the French National
Assembly abolished feudalism and promised a redistribution of land.
The Code Napoleon, enacted in 1804,
is revolutionary, to be sure, for it enacts the bourgeois
ideals of contract and property and recognizes them as gen-
erally applicable. As a code of private law, however, it is
uniquely in the service of the bourgeoisie, and is a clear
betrayal of the aspirations and interests of the workers and
peasants who were shock troopers of the Revolution.34
The French Revolution came to be depicted as a discontinuity
rather than as the culmination of 800 years of struggle by the bour-
geoisie. 5 In contrast, traditional English historians describe similar
changes there as accomplished with such continuity that it is difficult
to perceive them as changes. Tigar and Levy disagree:
[I]t would be wrong to say, as do some modem historians,
that the distinctive feature of English law is its gradual,
peaceable development in an unbroken line since Magna
Carta, or even since 1066. There were, on the contrary,
revolutionary changes between 1600 to 1800. If obstacles
remained that could not be knocked over with a law, or
surmounted with a writ, the English bourgeoisie was not
unwilling to turn to overtly revolutionary tactics. There
3 Id. 211-12.
32 Id. 218. This "was accomplished without overt violence to the landed class,
whose interests were nominally protected, left to be dealt with more harshly at
some future date." Id.
33 The bourgeoisie bore no small responsibility for the creation of a mon-
archy with claims to absolute power, for its interests had been served by
forceful Tudor policies. But having achieved a redistribution of land, and
having profited from the breakup of village life, the bourgeoisie sought
allies in a new struggle to restrain the power of the Crown to interfere
with trade. The common lawyers proved ready to join such an alliance.
Id. 227.
34 Id. 234.
35 Id.
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was at least an implicit connection between reason and vio-
lence. "I pray thee, in the bowels of Christ, think that ye
may be mistaken," Cromwell implored. But, on that occa-
sion, he had his army with him.86
Although the methods were somewhat different, and the myths
of extreme discontinuity in France and extreme continuity in
England persist,
[I]n both England and France a victorious class imposed a
new legal ideology by force, and because the interest of the
bourgeoisie in both countries was virtually identical, the
systems of private law in both turned out to be remarkably
similar. Yet the bourgeois revolutions in these two coun-
tries had rather different histories and one can detect a dif-
ference in innovative technique and in the rhetoric by
which social change was advocated. There is a profound
difference between Diderot's image of old idols crashing,
and Coke's metaphor of a new harvest from old fields. The
common-law judges and writers in England and America
have preserved Coke's approach. "In order to know what
it [the law] is," wrote Mr. Justice Holmes in this century,
"we must know what it has been and what it tends to be-
come." The image is not of the legislator changing and
building, but of judges and lawyers fashioning out of
historic usage new institutions to meet new needs.8 '
II.
With the exception of some generalizations, Law and the Rise
of Capitalism does not address the workings of the American legal
system. However, the implications of this book regarding law and
jurisprudence in the United States are profound and deserve some
elaboration.38
36 Id. 272. K. MARx, supra note 9, at 734-37, discusses some of the oppressive
vagabond laws to which the expropriated farmers were subjected.
3 7 TGAn & LEvy, supra note 4, at 272-73.
38 1 should explain how I arrived at my conclusions, since they result more
from my experience than from my reading the books, articles and cases cited in
these footnotes. My conclusions are primarily the result of my involvement in and
observations of our legal system during the 10 years I have practiced law, and of
the social and historical context of that period. The ability of our leaders and the
society as a whole to justify or accept extreme poverty in the midst of extreme
affluence, racism and the slaughter and terror we visited on the peoples of Indochina
led me to seek an explanation and understanding of our society that goes beyond
established thinking, which could explain neither what our society was doing nor
why it was so difficult to change. I have also been affected by my earlier training
in natural science and engineering, which left me suspect of claims that one's
actions or principles are the result of objective or scientific analysis, a claim that is
at the root of traditional jurisprudence.
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The basic tenet of a Marxian jurisprudence is that law reflects
underlying social relations and expresses and enforces, with the use
or threat of institutional violence, the social ideology of the dom-
inant class in society.39 As material conditions change and a new
class, with irreconcilable interests and ideology emerges and ascends,
.existing social relations will be challenged, and a new legal ideology
will challenge the old.40 When the dominant class is challenged, the
law may reflect a power shift, in the form of changed notions of
property, individual rights, and governmental power and organiza-
tion; become steadfastly entrenched in its enforcement of the status
quo (and thereby heighten the possibility of confrontation); com-
promise or avoid hard issues; or serve to control or contain such
challenges.4 1  Usually none of these roles-nor the existence of the
underlying conflict-are acknowledged; rather, the law justifies
its actions, even where they constitute significant changes, in terms
of the established ideological structure-be it god-given, natural law
or scientific.
The dominant class in the United States today is comprised of
the corporatized descendants of those rebels who overthrew the
feudal order-the bourgeoisie-and bourgeois ideology is evident
everywhere around us: at our workplaces, schools, churches, hospi-
391 was led by my studies to the conclusion that legal relations as well as
forms of state could neither be understood by themselves, nor explained by
the so-called general progress of the human mind, but that they are rooted
in the material conditions of life .... The mode of production in material
life determines the general character of the social, political, and spiritual
processes of life. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their
existence, but, on the contrary, their social existence that determines their
consciousness. At a certain stage of their development, the material forces
of production in society come in conflict with the existing relations of
production, or-what is but a legal expression of the same thing-with the
property relations within which they had been at work before. From
forms of development of the forces of production these relations turn into
their fetters. Then comes the period of social revolution. With the
change of the economic foundation the entire immense superstructure is
more or less rapidly transformed.
K. Mmnx, Preface to A CoNTmunoN To TH C=mQuE or PoMnCAx. EcoNoMY,
reprinted in MAnx & ENcEms, SEIEmn Worms 182-83 (New World Paperback
1968).
40 As Tigar and Levy point out, the role of law and legal ideology in social
change and everyday life is far more important in most western societies than in,
for example, China or Cuba.
41 Sometimes the law can provide an impetus to change, as it did in Brown v.
Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). There were longstanding movements
to establish the civil rights of minorities before Brown, but the decision clearly
gave added life to those movements and their cause. See R. K.ucmn, SnU',r.
JusncE (Vintage ed. 1977). The Brown decision and civil rights movements did
not challenge the dominant order; they extended the promise of equality within the
established system to racial minorities.
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tals, in our government, culture, family and intimate relations,
communication media-and in our courtrooms and Constitution.42
Our Constitution and judicial system reflect and enforce bourgeois
social relations, and our positive law and guiding precepts are based
on and limited by bourgeois ideology. Even seemingly unadul-
terated constitutional principles, such as freedom, equality and
justice, are defined in terms of bourgeois ideology. The courts will
enforce my right to speak and hand out a leaflet on a street corner,
a right advocated in the bourgeois struggle against feudalism; but
I cannot obtain space in a newspaper unless I am able to buy it and
unless the owner wants to print what I have to say. The courts will
provide relief if the government or, in some situations, a private
employer, refuses to hire people based on their race or sex, but there
is no right to a job, which must be acquired by exercise of the
fictional "freedom" to contract. There is a right to vote in federal
and local elections, but no right to vote or require an election con-
cerning the leadership and direction of the major corporations or
businesses that have a significant impact on a community, unless
one has a property interest in them. Some people live in abject
poverty while others enjoy virtually unlimited affluence, yet the
law provides no remedy, legal or equitable. This state of judicial
affairs is not due to a failure of the courts to enforce the law or to
do justice. Justice, freedom and equality have no meaning outside
of a particular system of social relations. It is precisely because the
law reflects and enforces underlying social relations that, without
substantial social change, one cannot obtain legal relief concerning
these matters and that to understand the law, one must examine
and understand bourgeois ideology, the contradictions of advanced
capitalism,43 and the ideology and strength of movements challeng-
ing the existing order.
4 2 The basic social theory of the Constitution, rooted in Locke and Mon-
tesquieu, was based on the protection of private property, the establishment
of a representative federal form of government, and the institution of a set
of prohibitions upon the national government designed to preserve sub-
stantive and procedural guarantees of freedom. These guarantees were
justified in terms of "natural justice," but their origin was less recondite;
they grew out of specific revolutionary and prerevolutionary events.
TIGAR & L vy, supra note 4, at 281.
43 We live in a society with unequalled resources and productive capacity that
provides material comfort and relative luxury to many. Yet a substantial number
of our people live on the edge of survival and most, in the middle and lower
classes, are often barely able to stay afloat. Blacks, other minorities and women
are subjected to discriminatory actions and institutions and expected to perform the
lowest tasks for subsistence pay and to provide a ready labor pool. We need
housing, medical care, schools, jobs, and the people of the world need food. Yet
our resources and the work and creativity of our people are squandered on the
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The two primary components of bourgeois legal ideology are as
evident today as they were in 1804. First and foremost are the
principles of property and contract that characterize the capitalist
system. They identify freedom with the unhindered ability to buy
and sell and enter into contracts. This notion of freedom is applied,
for example, to the employment contract, where
the fiction of free choice masks the reality that the wage-
laborer's lack of property compels him to hire out at wage-
work. To put it another way, the notion that property is
no more than a relationship between a person (persona)
and a thing (res), and therefore involves no domination
of person over person, is a fiction. Control of property-
when property consists of means of production-is con-
verted into control over persons through the medium of the
contract to work; thus the idea of contract as free bargain
is itself rendered illusory.
44
Second are the principles of personal freedom, democratic rights
and fairness to individuals (particularly in the criminal process), that,
although foremost to many allies of the bourgeoisie in the struggle
against feudalism, were promoted by the bourgeoisie primarily as
"essential to the political task of winning power." 45
Bourgeois principles of property and contract have been elab-
orated and accommodated to our centralized and monopolized form
of capitalism and protected by the law and the state. However,
production and marketing of fictitiously differentiated products (for example, 50
models of what amounts to three or four different cars and countless brands of
indistinguishable toothpaste) and useless and less than marginal appliances, goods
and services. Bourgeois freedom and democracy were won at tremendous costs
and have surely advanced the human condition in terms of productive capacity and
the importance of individual freedom. But the promise of freedom and democracy
cannot be realized when the most crucial decisions and principles that shape our
society and our lives--concerning the use of our resources, the work of our people,
control of the production process, which goods and services are produced, how
they are produced, and how they are distributed and used-are removed from the
democratic process and from "politics," leaving their resolution primarily to cor-
porate executives, who need not stand for election and whose guiding principle is
their own personal enrichment. State regulation and government economic activity
are largely carried out by and for the same people who control the private sector,
and they have protected and enhanced, not challenged, existing social relations.
This contradiction, most visible in periods of economic turmoil, places the freedom
of the capitalists and the freedom and democratic rights of working people, the
vast majority, in direct conflict. Marx, analyzing the contradictions in capitalism,
posited the emergence of socialist social relations and ideology and the ascendency
of socialist states in which the means of production would be controlled by and for
working people. For a Marxist analysis of advanced capitalism in contemporary
America, see H. BAvERmw, LABon AND MONOPOLY CAPITAL (1974).
4 4 TIGAR & Lzvy, supra note 4, at 305.
-1 Id. 323.
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bourgeois principles of individual freedom and fairness in the crim-
inal process have been attacked by corporate leaders and govern-
ment officials; their cause has been championed largely by move-
ments seeking change, such as the labor, civil rights and antiwar
movements. "The periods of stringent protection and enlargement
of civil rights and civil liberties correspond to the periods in which
mass movements posing a credible challenge to the existing order
have demanded such rights.46
The Supreme Court's recent decisions concerning exercise of
first amendment rights in privately owned shopping centers serve
as a contemporary example. In Amalgamated Food Employees
Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza,4 the Court upheld the right of
union members to picket a store in a shopping center concerning
a labor dispute. The Court recognized the reality that a large
portion of our urban population has moved from inner city areas
to suburbs and that shopping centers have to a large extent replaced
inner city business districts. To communicate with suburbanites
concerning the problems of the city, the nation or the world, the
best, and maybe only, place is shopping centers. The Court, citing
Marsh v. Alabama,48 in which first amendment freedoms were held
applicable to a "company town," ruled that the interest in free
speech outweighed the private property interest of the owner of
the shopping center. However, in Lloyd v. Tanner,49 the Court
held that an antiwar activist had no right to distribute leaflets in
a shopping center that regularly attracted political candidates with
the claim that it provided the largest audience in the state. The
majority opinion is largely devoted to a detailed, but unconvincing,
distinction of Logan Valley, primarily on the ground that speech
concerning a labor dispute is more related to the activities of a
shopping center than is antiwar speech. Then, in Hudgens v.
NLRB,50 the Court announced that Lloyd had overruled Logan
Valley (contrary to explicit language in Lloyd) and that to dis-
4
6 The right to speak on a street comer was first legally protected in the con-
text of the labor movement. E.g., Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1938). In the
1960's and early 1970's, the civil rights and antiwar movements demanded expanded
rights of speech, and first amendment rights were protected and expanded. E.g.,
Flower v. United States, 407 U.S. 197 (1972); Tinker v. Des Moines Community,
393 U.S. 503 (1969); Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966); Edwards v.
South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963). Recently, the Trilateral Commission, a pri-
vate association dominated by the multinational corporations, of which President
-Carter was a member before his election, has called for limitations on personal
liberties to promote economic stability.
47391 U.S. 308 (1968).
48326 U.S. 501 (1946).
49407 U.S. 551 (1972).
50424 U.S. 507 (1976).
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tinguish labor from antiwar speech would be an improper content
discrimination, which surely was not intended (although it was also
explicitly stated). Having just rewritten Lloyd, the Hudgens Court
then held that it was bound by Lloyd (as rewritten) and rejected
the right of union members to picket in a shopping center concern-
ing a labor dispute, stating: "Our institutional duty is to follow
until changed the law as it now is, not as some members of the
Court might wish it to be." r'
The Court offered no explanation of what happened to this
"institutional duty" in Lloyd, since the Lloyd Court would seem to
have been bound by Logan Valley (which the Hudgens Court held
had decided the same issue decided in Lloyd). Nor did the Court
explain how its duty to "follow until changed the law as it now is"
binds it in any real sense, since it can change the law or overule,
ignore or rewrite prior decisions (each of which it did in these cases).
The Supreme Court is never bound by a precedent; the statement by
a majority that it is bound means only that it has chosen to base
its ruling on a prior decision. Finally, the majority opinion casti-
gates the dissenting justices for deciding cases on the basis of what
they "might wish [the law] to be," but there is no indication of
how the majority's jurisprudence is different, except for the fact
that the majority outnumbered the minority.
Unstated and lost in this mire of contradictory justifications
and principles of decision-all of which can claim ample support in
precedent and logic-was the central point: that none of these cases
was or could be scientifically or objectively decided and that the
various justifications and principles emphasized 'in the opinions
mask little-discussed but unavoidable value judgments concerning
the conflict between freedom of speech, on the one hand, and private
property rights and the interest of suburbanites in isolation on the
other. In 1968, a majority of the members of the Court resolved
this conflict in favor of freedom of speech; in 1972, a majority re-
treated from that judgment; in 1976, a majority decided that prop-
erty interests and the insulation of suburbanites would prevail. Any
attempt to depict this change in terms of objectivity and continuity
is illusory, as the majority opinions in these cases demonstrate. The
changing social and political context and the changing personnel on
the Court (which are, of course, related) led to a change in value
judgment. The Hudgens opinion demonstrates a central deception'
of traditional jurisprudence: the majority claims for its value judg-
ment not only the status of law, which it surely has, but also the
51 Id. 518.
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legitimizing and mystifying attributes of objectivity and continuity,
to which it has no valid claim.
Traditional jurisprudence largely ignores social and historical
Teality and masks the existence and effect of ideology with myths that
identify bourgeois ideology with objectivity. The dominant system
of values has been declared value-free; it then follows that all others
suffer from bias.52 The positivist, natural law, realist and sociological
,schools of jurisprudence all identify bourgeois ideology with objec-
tivity or some form of higher law and are therefore incapable of
-explaining the role of bourgeois ideology in the law.53  Capitalism
has no claim to kinship with nature, science or god, and the classless,
non-ideological society is an illusion.54  The values protected by
,our legal system are based on advanced capitalist social relations
that developed from the struggle against feudalism in western
Europe, and to the extent that this system of social relations cannot
be maintained by the consent or acquiescence of the lower and
-middle classes, its enforcement rests on the state's mechanisms of
institutional violence.
A realistic, understandable jurisprudence that explains the role
.and operation ofthe law must acknowledge the conflicts in society,
the class basis of those conflicts and the dominance of a bourgeois
552 A good example of this thinking is to be found in Wechsler, Toward Neutral
Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. BEtv. 1 (1959). Professor Wechsler,
once Director of the American Law Institute, questions the neutrality of any decision
-that places democratic rights above property rights or places considerable weight
on the social and historical context, while repeatedly proclaiming his own political
views irrelevant to what he is saying. For example, he questions Brown v. Board
.of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), primarily on the ground that social and his-
torical reality were given too much importance when the "human and constitutional
,dimensions [of state-enforced segregation] lie entirely elsewhere in the denial by
.the state of freedom to associate." Id. 34.
53 Neither the sterile rigors of the positivists, nor the dreams of the natural-
law enthusiasts, nor the restricted vision of the realists and the sociologists
serves to describe, much less to explain, the means by which the bour-
geoisie first accommodated, then openly confronted, then overthrew the
legal ideology of feudalism. And none of these theories of law explains
the sharpening contradictions now appearing in the legal systems of the
%Vest.
All of these schools either describe the legal system constructed by the
victorious bourgeoisie as a static institution, or in some measure seek to
justify it, or attempt to explain those of its inner workings that have to do
with adjusting internal conflict. None is concerned with analyzing the
revolutionary beginnings of legal ideology, or with identifying those social
forces which may-also by revolutionary means-bring into being a newly
dominant legal ideology based upon a different system of social relations.
TicAR & Lxvy, supra note 4, at 310.
54 See C. ArNDEso,-4, Tim PoLIricAL EcoNomY oF SociAL CLAss (1974);
G.W. DomoFr, WHO Rur.;s AimIcA? (1967); R. MILMaND, THm ST ITE IN
CAPITALIST SocIETY (1969); M. ZETLn, A.NmucAMr SocmTyr, INc. (1977).
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ideology that is not natural, scientifically determined or objective.
Further, the value content of rulings and the broad discretion avail-
able to judges, particularly at the higher levels, should be empha-
sized rather than masked. Our legal norms are broadly and vaguely
stated; a wide variety of contradictory justifications are available;
and judges have the authority and power explicitly or implicitly to
ignore constitutional provisions, statutes, precedents and the best of
legal arguments. The discretionary, legislative nature of court
decisions, the importance of value judgments and the dominance of
bourgeois ideology characterize our judicial process far better than
any notions of objectivity or science.
However, the dominance of bourgeois ideology and the discre-
tion available to judges do not mean that all rulings are made in
favor of bourgeois interests, that judges are always conscious of the
effect of ideology or the value content of rulings,55 or that judges
always apply their personal values and ideology. The effects of
ideology, institutional norms and personal experience on value
judgments and perceptions of fact situations, credibility and social
reality are complex and should not be oversimplified. Moreover,
bourgeois ideology, because it encompasses notions of freedom,
justice and equality, often provides a nonrevolutionary basis for
challenging bourgeois interests. There are limits on the dominant
class and government, and although the government and bourgeois
class usually have the power and often the inclination to exceed
these limits, maintenance of bourgeois hegemony without frequent
resort to force depends on widespread belief in the legitimacy of the
law, which is undermined by such transgressions.5" Finally, the law,
55 For many, if not most, judges, and for most people, results are of primary
importance and justifications are secondary. Even where a judge does not con-
sciously decide based on a value judgment concerning the results, such judgments
have an important, and usually determinative, effect. For example, all of the
Justices of the Supreme Court have used precedent to justify their decisions, but
they do not treat all precedents equally. In the shopping center cases discussed in
text earlier, Justices who place a preeminent value on freedom of speech found
Marsh and Logan Valley important precedents that should be followed, while
Justices who found property interests more important placed considerable prece-
dential value on Lloyd. The justifications for both sides were available from
which to pick and choose; value judgments about the substance of the case guide
such choices, even where they are not the explicit or conscious basis of decision.
56 [The law] may be seen instrumentally as mediating and reinforcing
existent class relations and, ideologically, as offering to these a legitima-
tion. . . . [But if] the law is evidently partial and unjust, then it will
mask nothing, legitimize nothing, contribute nothing to any class's hegem-
ony. The essential precondition for the effectiveness of law, in its function
as ideology is that it shall display an independence from gross manipula-
tion and shall seem to be just. It cannot seem to be so without upholding
its own logic and criteria of equity ....
* * 0 *
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while it is based on and enforces underlying social relations, has
some autonomy and should not be seen as exclusively superstruc-
tural.57
There are cases where the importance of the issues, the existence
of discretion and the effect of ideology are clear, such as Youngstown
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer.58 Yet even where it is clear that
bourgeois dominance is being seriously challenged, there is often
disagreement among bourgeois leaders and ideologists, as well as
among the leaders and ideologists of the forces making the challenge,
as to the proper course and the best result. Gompers v. Buck's Stove
and Range Co.59 provides a valuable example.
In 1907, the American Federation of Labor (AFL) attempted
to organize the workers at Buck's Stove, whose president, James Van
Cleve, was also president of the National Association of Manufac-
turers (NAM). ° The leaders of the AFL called for a national
boycott of Buck's Stove products, and Van Cleve obtained an injunc-
tion prohibiting them from "publishing or otherwise making any
statement that the Buck's Stove and Range Co. was, or had been, on
the 'Unfair' or 'We Don't Patronize' lists." "I AFL leaders, includ-
ing Samuel Gompers, were held in contempt of court and sentenced
to jail terms for violating the injunction, and the Supreme Court
heard their appeal.
Important bourgeois interests were clearly at stake, but
bourgeois elements disagreed how they would best be served. The
NAM, mainly representing small manufacturers, took a hard line,
vehemently opposing all unions and union activity and advocating
use of the repressive mechanisms of the state and private agencies
wherever possible. However, many larger manufacturers and lead-
ers in finance and international business, equally anti-union and
involved in violent resistance to organizing drives themselves, saw
the hard line as leading to revolution. These elements of the
[I]n history the law can be seen to mediate and to legitimize existent
class relations. Its forms and procedures may crystalize those relations and
mask ulterior injustice. But this mediation, through the forms of law, is
something quite distinct from the exercise of unmediated force. The forms
and rhetoric of law acquire a distinct identity -which may, on occasion,
inhibit power and afford some protection to the powerless.
E. P. THorsoN, WmGs AND HuNTERns 262-63, 266 (Pantheon ed. 1975).
57 See note 69 infra & accompanying text.
58 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (invalidating President Truman's seizure of steel mills).
59221 U.S. 418 (1911).
60 The facts presented here that are not contained in the Court's opinion are
from J. WESTmN, Tim CoRPoRaTE IDEAL iN TH LmERAL STATE: 1900-1918
(1968) and G.W. DoMno7, I-Gmm CiRcLEs (1970).
61 221 U.S. at 436.
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bourgeoisie, and their primary organization, the. National Civic
Federation, formulated an ideology called corporate liberalism by"
"revisionist" historians. The law and the state would recognize
unions and regulate the conflict between -labor and capital, the
economic chaos of uncontrolled capitalism would be regulated *and
stabilized, the rise of conservative labor leaders would- be promoted,
and the explicitly pro-business slant of the law and other institutions
would be made less blatant by use of notions of .objectivity and a
classless, pluralistic society.62 Andrew Carnegie, among the latter
group, contributed to the legal expenses of Gompers and the other
union leaders, and they were defended by Alton Parker, a prestigious
business lawyer and former presidential candidate.
63
62 "Revisionist" historians have challenged the predominant progressive -or
liberal notion that, in the words of Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., "[liberalism in
America has been ordinarily the movement on the part of the other sectors of
society to restrain the power of the business community." A.M. Sc .ERSNOcm, JR.,
TBE AGE OF JACKSoN 505 (1946). In the liberal or progressive view, regulatory.
legislation, such as the Sherman Antitrust Act and the Federal Trade Commission
Act, represent victories in the struggle of workers, farmers, consumers and small
businessmen against a wholly resistant big business. However, the revisionists have
shown that these measures, though initiated and pushed by mass movements, were
adopted with the eventual support of and largely formulated by the corporate
liberals, the dominant sector of American big business, and that they tended to
stabilize the economy and thereby to strengthen big business. See G.W. Domanorz,
supra note 60; K. Klare, The Judicial Deradicalization of the Wagner Act and the
Origins of Modem Legal Consciousness, 62 MwN. L. REv. - (1978) (forthcoming);
G. Korxo, THE TmIuMPH OF CONsERVATmsm: A REITERP ETATION OF AmmcRAN
Hisrony, 1900-1916 (1963); J. WEsm1, supra note 60; W.A. WAm.rA~s, Tim
CoNTOURs OF AmERIcAN HISTORY (1961); W.A. Wnr. Ams, THE TRAGEDY OF
AMmEIcAN DIPLOMACY (1959). See also G. ADAMs, JR., TnE AGE OF INDUSTrAL
VioinEcE (1975); F." PrvN & R. CLowAw, REGULA NG THE POOR: Tnm FuNqTmoNs
OF Ptuac WELFARE (1971). Some of these writings tend to overestimate the
dominance of the corporate liberals and underestimate the power and effect of
movements of working people, but the basic thesis has the support of extensive
historical evidence, including the speeches, writings and letters of corporate liberal
leaders.
63 J. WEINSTEN, supra note 60, at 49. Carnegie also provided the primary
funding for the American Law Institute, which stated in its founding document:
There is today general dissatisfaction with the administration of jus-
tice. The feeling of dissatisfaction is not confined to that radical section
of the community which would overthrow existing social, economic and
political institutions. If it were, we as lawyers could afford to ignore it.
But the opinion that the law is unnecessarily uncertain and complex, that
many of its rules do not work well in practice, and that its administration
often results not in justice, but in injustice, is general among all classes
and among persons of widely divergent political and social opinions.
It is unnecessary to emphasize here the danger from this general
dissatisfaction. It breeds disrespect for law, and disrespect for law is the
corner-stone of revolution.
Report of the Committee on the Establishment of a Permanent Organization for the
Improvement of the Law Proposing the Establishment of an American Law Insti-
tute, ALI PRocEEDINGS 1 (1923). The- ALI has served as a primary institution for
the development and dissemination of corporate liberal legal ideology.
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The Court, surely aware of the split within bourgeois circles
as well as of the conflict between labor and capital, explicitly ex-
pressed its bourgeois ideological base and function: "The court's
protective and restraining powers extend to every device whereby
property is irreparably damaged or commerce is illegally re-
strained." " The defendants' free speech claim was rejected by the
Court on the ground that speech had not been restrained but only
what the Court called "verbal acts." 65 However, the Court did not
sustain the imprisonment of Gompers and the other union leaders,
which would have created a national uproar and perhaps become a
rallying point for the movement of working people. At the conclu-
sion of a detailed substantive ruling in favor of business interests,
the Court decided that the contempt was moot since the underlying
civil action had been settled.66 In terms of traditional jurispru-
dence, the Court balanced rights and interests concerning several
constitutional provisions and made rulings on contempts, boycotts,
speech and mootness; in the real world, the Court reaffirmed its
adherence to bourgeois ideology and the role of the law in further-
ing bourgeois interests, mediated a split among bourgeois elements
and reached a very practical compromise that preserved bourgeois
dominance without fomenting confrontation.
IlL.
Tigar and Levy reject the notion that "legal change, or changes
in legal ideology, caused the transition from feudalism to'capital-
ism." 67 The historical data they gather support their conclusion
that legal change reflects changing material conditions and social
relations 61 and that law "is a superstructure erected upon the base of
power relationships." 69
64221 U.S. at 439 (emphasis supplied).
65 Id.
6 Id. 451-52. The civil action was settled after the death of Van Cleve.
67 TIGAn & LV, supra note 4, at xv (emphasis in original).
68 One can also discern examples of the law as an arena of class struggle and
the use of the law as an instrument of change. E.g., id. 139 (use of legal devices
to unite crown and bourgeoisie at expense of feudal lords; result was fostering of
trade); id. 68 (twelfth century lawyers "working for the strong" use knowledge of
Roman law to draft contracts favorable to commercial interests). Sometimes the
intimate relation between legal and social development is obvious but the direction
of cause-and-effect is unclear. E.g., id. 164 ("alliance" between monarchs, com-
mercial interests, and legal profession).
69 Id. 279. The use of the terms "superstructure" and "base" could connote
a view, held by some Marxists, that fails to recognize the complexity of the role
and operation of the law discussed above. However, Tigar and Levy were not
attempting in this book to describe or explain our judicial system in any detail,
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Yet their discussion in the concluding chapters of the role-of
alternative legal ideology, or what they call the "jurisprudence of
insurgency," in the bourgeois struggle against feudalism and in
struggles against capitalism raises an apparent contradiction. Their
emphasis on the revolutionary role of legal ideology and lawyers and
the importance placed on the phrase "jurisprudence of insurgency"
leave the impression that the autonomy of the law and its role as
an arena of social change have been overstated in a way that con-
flicts with the major thesis of the book.
70
and their analysis of the judicial process in the change from feudalism to capitalism
recognizes such complexity.
Little has been written about the existence, source or extent of the autonomy
of the law or its effect on actual decisions by those who reject the traditional view
of virtually complete autonomy and objectivity. The various views of the autonomy
of the law can be placed on a continuum where the extreme of total autonomy is
occupied by the traditional notion of the law as separate from social relations and
political forces, and the extreme of no autonomy is occupied by the notion of the
law as exclusively superstructural. Eugene Genovese writes:
[T]he fashionable relegation of the law to the rank of a superstructural and
derivative phenomenon obscures the degree of autonomy it creates for
itself. In modem societies at least, the theoretical and moral foundations
of the legal order and the actual, specific history of its ideas and institu-
tions influence, step by step, the wider social order and system of class
rule, for no class in the modem Western world could rule for long without
some ability to present itself as the guardian of the interests and senti-
ments of those being ruled.
E. GENovEsE, RoL., JoRDAN, RoLL: THE Wor.n THE Sr.AvEs MADE 25 (Vintage
Books 1976). To the extent Genovese is saying only that the law appears to
be and sometimes is "the guardian of the interests and sentiments of those being
ruled," his analysis does not demonstrate the existence of autonomy since an effec-
tive superstructure would have that attribute (unless one limits the superstructure
model to a monolithic system in which the dominant class always wins). An
entirely superstructural legal system could recognize the need to appear to be and
sometimes to be such a "guardian" in order to legitimize itself. However, Genovese
and Thompson (quoted'supra note 56) are saying more than this. The law, though
integrally tied to underlying social relations and political forces, is not only an
effect but also a cause, and, to some extent, it has an autonomous existence.
70 For example, Tigar and Levy, discussing the role of progressive lawyers,
say:
While the legal obligations of workers and owners are defined by the
dominant ideology, lawyers attempt to change and adapt them, to adjust
differences without disturbing the integrity of the ideological system as a
whole. Real improvements in the lives of ordinary people come about
through these changes: consumer credit legislation to prevent gouging and
unfair practices; fair housing legislation; equal employment projects man-
dating compensatory treatment for blacks, Chicanos, and women. They
come about because jurisprudents penetrate the legal ideology and its
norms and expose the interests they protect, thus clarifying and helping to
justify the demand that public law be changed to curb the domain of the
"freedom" of contract. In the battle for the freedoms of speech and asso-
ciation, and for due process of law, the lawyer demands that constitutional
principle be honored and constitutional promises be kept.
TIcGA & Lzvy, supra note 4, at 328-29. Just as the development of contract theory
should not be seen as the cause of the transition from feudalism to capitalism, the
development of an alternative to bourgeois legal ideology and the efforts of pro-.
gressive lawyers should not be seen as the causes of social change in the present
[Vol 126:930
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This is, however, only a minimal distraction from the authors'
excellent analysis of the relation of law to material conditions and
social relations. The bourgeois struggle against feudalism and the
formation and development of bourgeois social relations and
ideology are crucial to a realistic understanding of the law and the
state in the United States. Law and the Rise of Capitalism provides
a vital link in the development and elaboration of a socially and
historically contextual jurisprudence and should be read by all who
study or want to understand law and jurisprudence.
period. Reforms concerning discrimination, housing, and consumer rights reflect
shifting power relationships and, in some cases, the successes of mass movements.
Vindication and enlargement of first amendment freedoms have been accomplished
in the context of mass movements that demand democratic rights. Progressive
lawyers have an important role in movements for change, but the development of
alternative legal ideology and of arguments that expose and clarify contradictions,
though necessary, will not create change.
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FEDERAL ADMINSTRATVE LAW JUDGE HEAINGS: Statistical Report for 1975. By
Uniform Caseload Accounting System, Office of the Chairman, Administrative
Conference of the United States. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing
Office, 1977. Pp. 272, $4.00 paperbound.
FE;DEaL No-FAUmT INsURANCE LEGISLATION. Washington, D.C.: American Enter-
prise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1978. Pp. 57. $2.00 paperbound.
THE FIRST Bi-ANNUAL REPORT BY = Gmm n.N MONOPOLIES CO2MuSSION: Mehr
Wettbewerb ist maglich. Baden-Baden, Germany: Nomos-Verlagsgesellschaft,
1976. Pp. 751.
THE Gimnsm.. By Michael Maccoby. New York: Bantam Books (reprint),
1978. Pp. xii, 302. $2.75 paperbound.
HAVEN IN A HEARTLESS WoRLD: The Family Besieged. By Christopher Lascb.
New York: Basic Books, 1977. Pp. xviii, 230. $15.00 paperbound.
HoMosExuALIT RE-ExA~nNED. By D. J. West. Minneapolis: University of Min-
nesota Press, 1977. Pp. viii, 359. $20.00.
How To GET INrO LAW ScHOOL. Revised Edition. By Rennard Strickland. New
York: Hawthorn Books, 1977. Pp. xii, 194. $4.95 paperbound.
AN INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATiVE LAW: Vol. 1: The Framework; Vol. II: The
Institutions of Private Law. By Konrad Zweigert & Hein Kotz. Amsterdam,
The Netherlands: North-Holland, 1977. 2 volumes, pp. xviii, 386; xviii, 380.
$87.75 (per set).
THE LAST Ex r. By Timothy David Takata. Roslyn Heights, N.Y.: Libra
Publishers, 1977. Pp. 120. $6.95.
LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTErNATIONAL EcoNO.mc RELrTIONS: Cases, Materials and
Text (with Documents Supplement). By John H. Jackson. St. Paul: West,
1977. Pp. lxx, 1097.
LOOKING AT LAw ScHOoL: A Student Guide from the Society of American Law
Teachers. Edited by Stephen Gillers. New York: New American Library,
1977. Pp. xix, 234. $4.95 paperbound.
MmTARY BA.SE CLOSINGS: BmErmrrs FOR CoMmmuN ADjusTnmENT. Washington,
D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1977. Pp. 20.
$2.00 paperbound.
POSTAL SEavicm LEGISLATrVE PROPOSALS. Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise
Institute for Public Policy Research, 1977. Pp. 36. $2.00 paperbound.
THE PROBABLE .m TA E PRovABLE. By L. Jonathan Cohen. New York: Oxford
University Press, 1977. Pp. xvi, 363. $22.00.
PROPOSAls FOR A NATIONAL COURT OF APPEALS. Washington, D.C.: American
Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1977. Pp. 52. $2.00 paper-
bound.
PUBLIC F)wANcING OF CONGRESSIONAL CAmPAIGNS. Washington, D.C.: American
Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1978. Pp. 44. $2.00 paper-
bound.
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SrG'crnmcANr DECISIONS Oa ThE SupnwE COuRT, 1975-1976 TmEm. By Bruce E.
Fein. Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy
Research, 1977. Pp. 198. $4.75 paperbound.
SUwTnvE CmxAL LAW. By M. Cherif Bassiouni. Springfield, Ill.: Charles C.
Thomas, 1977. Pp. xr, 552. $24.50.
WATERWAY USER CaAmGES. Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for
Public Policy Research, 1977. Pp. 28. $2.00 paperbound.
ZImo-BAsE BuDc;TN AND SUNsET LEGISLATON. Washington, D.C.: American
Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1978. Pp. 38. $2.00 paper-
bound.
ZoN-NG Co,noL OF SEX BusN-Ess: The Zoning Approach to Controlling Adult
Entertainment. By Fredric A. Strom. New York: Clark Boardman Co., 1977.
Pp. xiii, 139. $5.95 paperbound.
